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Co-management strategy for the sustainable use of coral reef resources in the 





The National Natural Park “Corales del Rosario y San Bernardo”, located in the Caribbean Sea, 
is  one  of  the  most  important  parks  in  Colombia  since  it  hosts  high  biological  biodiversity, 
receives more tourists than any other natural park in the country and provides sustenance to 
several communities settled in and around it. However, lack of governance and incompatibility 
of  incentives  among  authorities,  communities  and  visitors  threaten  its  conservation  and 
sustainability.  Using  experimental  economic  games  with  fisherman  communities,  we  tested 
different  rules  related  with  the  management  of  natural  resources  in  the  protected  area.  In 
addition to standard rules of communication and external regulation, we tested a rule called co-
management, in which we explored the complementarities between repeated communication 
and external non-coercive authority intervention. We also tested inter temporal effects where 
over extraction (by the group) in a round reduces the availability of resource for next round and, 
in  consequence,  increases  effort  and  reduces  benefits  for  fishers.  Results  confirmed  the 
effectiveness of communication and, to some extent, external regulation. More important than 
that, co-management treatment exhibit –no matter the location of the communities with respect 
to  the  park-  the  best  results  in  terms  of  sustainable  use  of  the  resource.  Participants 
incorporated  dynamic  implications  in  their  decisions  when  information  asymmetries  were 
overcome, through internal communication or external guidance. These results highlight the 
importance  of  resource  management  designs  that  recognize  communities  as  key  actors  in 
decision  making  for  the  sustainable  use  and  conservation  of  common  pool  resources  in 
protected areas. 
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1.  Background 
 
The National Natural Park “Corales del Rosario y San Bernardo” (NNP-CRSB), located in the 
Colombian Caribbean Sea, is one of the seven marine protected areas in the country and is 
considered  strategic  since  it  conserves  the  most  developed  fringe  of  coral  reef  in  the 
Continental  Colombian  marine  platform,  hosting  high  biological  diversity.  This  park  was 
established in 1977 and expanded to its current extension (approximately 120,000 ha) in 1997 
(Pineda et al., 2005). 
 
Despite  the  national  and  global  relevance  of  this  park,  it  presents  some  particularities  that 
restrict the achievement of the conservation goals established for this marine protected area. 
There  exist  many  sources  of  pressure  for  resources  in  this  protected  area,  being  over 
exploitation  of  marine  resources  by  native  communities  and  uncontrolled  tourism two  of the 
most  important  –or  at  least  the  most  visible-.  When  the  park  was  created,  in  1977,  many 
fisherman  communities  were  already  established  within  and  around  the  park.  These 
communities exhibit  low standards of living and their main income generating activity  is the 
extraction of hydro biological resources from the protected area.  On the other hand, given the 
beauty and attractiveness of the park, it is largely visited by national and international tourists. In 
fact, this is not only the most visited park in the country but also one of the most hardly exposed 
to overexploitation. The presence of an intensive tourism generates an additional pressure due 
to, among others, the need of satisfying fish and other marine resources demand from visitors 
(Camargo et al., 2007). 
 
In spite of the creation of the park and the existence of laws and regulations controlling access 
and uses, scientific reports and perception from both authorities and communities indicate a 
reduction in hydro biological resources during last decades. Many species in the park are under 
threat and some of them seem to have disappeared locally, as in the case of the snail Strombus 
gigas
2,  and  other  species  of  fish  and  coral  reef.  As  a  response  to  reduction  in  resources, 
fishermen  have  increased  fishing  effort  not  only  by  fishing  for  longer  periods  or  at  farther 
distances but also, in some cases, by violating regulations when using inappropriate fishing 
                                                 
 
2 Type of snail which is not only consumed for food by locals and tourists but also used for craftsmanship 
and as a construction material 3 
 
techniques,  extracting  under  minimum  permitted  sizes  and  extracting  species  with  full 
restriction, given their protection or threat status, generating a conflict between communities and 
park authorities (Camargo et al., 2007).  
 
The conflict between park authorities and fisherman communities is born from a divergence 
between park conservation social objectives and fishermen private interests. This divergence is 
typical of common pooled resources -CPR- (Ostrom, 1990) which are characterized by both non 
excludability and rivalry (Feeny et al., 1990). Non excludability relates to the fact that, given the 
nature of the resource, it may be prohibitively costly to control the access by potential users, 
while rivalry means that extraction of the resource by one user affects adversely the benefits of 
other users (Baden, 1998; Feeny et al., 1990), and even that user´s long-term welfare as well 
(Baden and Noaan, 1997). These characteristics make that CPR cannot be considered neither 
as a private nor as a pure public good and constitute the source of conflict between private and 
collective interests (Cardenas, Ahn and Ostrom, 2003). In the case of a natural park, collective 
interests are affected beyond fisherman communities, since a national park is established with 
the clear social objective of conserving the biological diversity it hosts.  
   
Fisheries are perhaps one the best examples of common pooled resources where as long as 
each additional unit extracted by a fisherman represents additional gains for him, the costs of 
that unit extracted are shared and distributed among all fishermen and society as a whole. So, 
individual  fisherman  assumes  merely  the  private  costs  of  its  actions  -ignoring  social  costs-, 
lading collectively to the over exploitation of a resource that is perceived as “free” (Gordon, 
1954; Hardin, 1968). Gordon in his classic paper “The economic theory of a common-property 
research: the fishery“, written in 1954, and 14 years later,  Hardin (1968),  with his well known 
“Tragedy of Commons” suggested  that self centered and short sighted behavior of agents will 
lead to overuse and rapid depletion of these resources. In addition, when fishers realize that the 
resource is being depleted, they often over invest in harvesting technology as each resource 
user tries to sustain his catch in the face of a diminishing resource (Baden, 1998). 
 
In order to avoid “the tragedy”, Hardin (1968; Hardin and Baden, 1977; Hardin, 1978) proposed 
two general solutions: to allocate property rights either privately or to the state, with clearly 
instituted regulations to control access and uses. In these solutions, it is implicitly assumed that 
no other property rights regime -nor a combination of them-, would give enough incentives to 
agents  to  maintain  and  conserve  CPR,  assumption  that  comes  not  only  from  the  fact  that 4 
 
“tragedy  of  commons” models  a  purely  individualistic  behavior  of  agents  –ignoring  social  or 
collective  behavior  (Hanna  and  Jentoft,  1996)-  but  also  from  the  fact  that  –likely-  Hardin 
assumed no difference between communal property and open access (Feeny et al., 1990).  
 
In  the  National  Natural  Park  CRSB,    it  appears  that  state  property  -in  which  norms  and 
regulations about uses and users have been imposed-, has been not sufficient to provide for 
adequate exclusion and that the crescent interests conflict between fisherman communities and 
park  authorities  are  restricting  the  achievement  of  the  conservation  goals  in  this  marine 
protected area. There are many factors that might be contributing to this situation making that 
de jure state property seems more a de facto open access: i) size of the park, ii)  physical 
characteristics and nature  of the resource, iii)  strong budget constraints, iv) lack of information 
and v) a complex relation between community and authorities (Camargo et al., 2007).  These 
factors  impede  to  reach  the  optimal  equilibrium  that  is  supposed  to  be  achieved  under 
centralized  control,  because  assumptions  such  as  accuracy  of  information,  monitoring 
capabilities, sanctioning reliability and zero cost of administrations do not hold (Ostrom, 1990). 
 
After Hardin´s, other alternatives, based on collective action, have been proposed in order to 
address CPR dilemma. These alternatives are supported on strong empirical evidence showing 
that worldwide there are communities that have been able to organize themselves around self 
governing institutions, to design and define rules and mechanisms as well as sanctions and 
penalties to solve the divergence between individual and collective interest, that arise from the 
joint use of CPR (Ostrom, 1990). Experimental evidence has also shown that individuals do not 
always  behave  as  if  they  were  purely  self  interested  and  that  they  often  make  decisions 
balancing own and collective interests (Davis and Holt, 1993; Kagel and Roth, 1995 in Murphy 
and Cardenas, 2003). During last decades many field and lab experiments have supported the 
argument  that  agents’  utility  is  affected  by  other  factors  rather  than  pure  material  gains, 
specifically  that  individual’s  behavior  is  also  determined  by  others-regarding  preferences 
(Cardenas, 2004), in which elements of altruism, fairness, reciprocity and reputation could play 
a relevant role (Ostrom, 1998; Bowles, 1998; Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 
in Cardenas, 2004; Castillo and Saysel, 2005).  
 
Although  there  is  a  consensus  that  self  governing  strategies  may  emerge  and  succeed,  it 
strongly depends on many factors such as the institutional environment, the production function 
involved in the use of the commons (Cardenas, 2004), the social cohesion of communities, the 5 
 
size of the groups involved, and the degree of interaction of these communities with the market. 
Rova (2004) argues that it is doubtful that a pure self-governing institution be a realistic option 
for the case of complex and diverse fisheries in a modern industrial society, given that both 
pressure  of  the  markets  and  integration  with  surrounding  society,  may  undermine  collective 
(traditional) management. 
  
Around the world, the CPR dilemma associated with marine fishery resources has shown to be 
very complex to counteract because, on one hand, it is impossible to allocate individual property 
rights  and,  on  the  other,  state  property  has  proved,  in  many  cases,  not  to  be  an  effective 
strategy  in  the goal  of protecting  and conserving  marine  biological resources.    Feeny  et  al. 
(1990) suggest that a viable option could be a combination of state regulation and user self-
management, in a type of shared governance. Worldwide many state protected areas, facing 
governance problems and over use of resources, are increasingly opting for trying collaborative 
or joint management strategies in which power, making decision process and responsibilities 
are  shared  at  different  degrees  between  local  agents  -users  of  resources-,  and  authorities 
(McCay, 1996). This institutional arrangement, that might also be seen as a combination of 
communal and state property rights is also known as co-management. Co-management has 
been  seen  as  an  alternative  that  improves  both  effectiveness  and  equitability  of  fisheries 
management as well as compliance with agreed upon rules (Jentoft, 1989; McCay, 1996). 
 
In the complex context of conflict between park authorities and fisherman communities, and 
deterioration of the marine resources in the park, the objective of this paper is to identify the 
characteristics, incentives and mechanisms both individual and collective, that can motivate the 
agents to a sustainable use of the resources in the National Natural Park “Corales del Rosario y 
San  Bernardo”  (NNP-CRSB).  Particularly,  this  paper  is  aimed  to  answer,  using  economic 
experimental games, the following question: is collaborative management or co-management a 
possible strategy for the management of fish and reef resources in the NNP-CRSB, which might 
improve the  governance  and  lead  to  a  sustainable  use  of  hydro  biological  resources  in  the 
protected area? 
 
Economic experimental games –EEG- have been used not only to validate and support the 
classical model in market settings but also to challenge the rational choice model in non market 
settings, particularly when talking about CPR and public goods (Walker, Gardner and Ostrom, 
1990;  Ostrom,  Walker  and  Gardner,  1992).  These  experimental  games  have  become  an 6 
 
important tool to analyze the dilemma between private and collective interests and the behavior 
of agents using CPR (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994; Ostrom, 2000). 
 
In Colombia, many economic experimental games have been carried out in field to analyze the 
behavior of individuals facing in their daily life the conflicts associated with the use of CPR 
(Cardenas, Strandlund and Willis, 2000; Cardenas, 2003; Cardenas, 2004; Velez, Murphy and 
Strandlund, 2006). Those studies have analyzed several issues ranging from the role of both 
individual  cooperation  and  external  institutions  in  CPR  dilemmas,  to  the  effect  of  individual 
wealth  and  social  distance  in  individual  game  decisions,  testing  different  types  of  informal 
communication,  several  degrees  of  external  regulation  and  individual  economic  wealth 
(Cardenas, Strandlund and Willis, 2000; Cardenas, 2000; Cardenas, Ahn and Ostrom, 2003; 
Cardenas, 2004).  
 
Generally speaking, the findings of these experiments support the arguments that individuals 
facing CPR dilemmas are able to cooperate and make decisions that might lead them to obtain 
greater benefits and to conserve the resources they extract. In addition, those findings also 
show that external control or regulation on CPR or public goods may not be as effective as it is 
expected  from theory  and  that  it  could  even  crowd-out  other  regarding  behavior  in  favor  of 
greater self interest (Cardenas, 2000; Cardenas, Strandlund and Willis, 2000; Cardenas, 2004). 
Those studies also show that individual decisions about CPR may be affected by the economic 
wealth  of  individuals,  the  dependence  of  individuals  on  the  resource,  the  type  of  allowed 
communication and the degree of imposed regulation.  
 
In Colombia, however, very few experiments have tested combinations of institutions in which 
cooperation and external control play a simultaneous role. Velez, Murphy and Strandlund (2006) 
conducted a field experiment with fisherman communities in three regions in Colombia. They 
examined the complementarities between face-to-face communication and external regulation 
to  conserve  a  local  natural  resource.  They  found  that  the  hypothesis  of  complementarities 
between communication and external regulation cannot be supported in general, although it 
holds for some communities and under some regulations.  
 
Given the particular complex relationship between fisherman communities and authorities in the 
national natural park CRSB, in this study we test the complementarity –that we have called co-
management- between repeated communication and non-coercive government regulation, to 7 
 
manage and conserve resources at the natural park. Particularly, the non coercive government 
strategy we test here requires the participation of officials from the NNP-CRSB who work with 
communities on environmental education. So, the involvement of a real official of the NNP-
CRSB  as  an  additional  player  on  the  experimental  game  and  the  environmental  education 
strategy -opposed to coercive strategies as penalties- constitute an innovative approach for field 
experimental games analyzing CPR dilemmas.  
 
On the  other  hand,  most  experimental games developed  with  real  communities facing  CPR 
dilemmas have not taken into account the inter-temporal effect of the extraction of the resource. 
Dynamic issues of CPR might exacerbate CPR problems as individuals –acting myopically- do 
not consider the full impact of their current decision about extraction on their own and others 
future extraction costs (Herr et al., 1997).  Herr et al. (1997) use laboratory experiments to 
analyze time-independent and time-dependent externalities in non-renewable commons, and 
found that myopic behavior not only exacerbates CPR problem, but also that even individuals 
who take into account current and future effects of their extraction decisions might  enter into a 
race for resources if they believe others may be acting myopically. In this paper we analyze, 
using  field  experimental  games,  if  fisherman  communities  in  NNP-CRSB  behave  myopically 
when making extraction decisions on renewable natural resource, as suggested by results from 
lab experiment conducted in a non-renewable resource setting by Herr et al. (1997).  
 
This paper is organized as follows: Following this background we present the theoretical model 
in order to arrive to the experimental design in third section. In the fourth part of the paper we 
present the empirical model we use and its main results, and in fifth section we present the 
conclusions of the paper.  
 
2.  The theoretical model 
 
In the presence of externalities the social optimum differs from private equilibrium. Particularly, 
when facing social dilemmas as the one associated with CPR, in which private interests diverge 
from social or collective interests, the theoretical prediction from non cooperative game theory 
establishes  that  individuals  (players)  will  not  make  decisions  that  lead  to  a  social  optimum; 
instead,  individuals  will  play  strategies  that  lead  them  to  a  suboptimal  Nash  equilibrium 
(Cardenas, Ahn and Ostrom, 2003), arriving to the prisoners dilemma. Non cooperative game 
theory  also  establishes  that  this  prediction  will  not  change  even  if  individuals  (players)  are 8 
 
allowed to communicate with others without external enforcement of agreements (Cardenas, 
Ahn and Ostrom, 2003).  In other words, the standard theory predicts that purely self-interested 
individuals will extract more fish than is socially optimal even if other institutions are in place. 
However, empirical evidence challenges this theoretical prediction: behavior in public good and 
common-pool resource experiments deviates from Nash equilibrium strategies not only when 
subjects are merely allowed to communicate with one another (Ostrom and Walker, 1991) but 
also when they are unable to communicate. Following those ideas, we postulate a theoretical 
model  that  let  us  to  understand  how  fishermen  in  NNP-CRSB  make  decisions  about  fish 
extraction and how much and under what situations or institutions those decisions deviate from 
theoretical  predictions.  In  this  sense,  our  purpose  is  to  compare  the  empirical  results  of 
economic experimental games carried out in fisherman communities with expected results from 
two theoretical standard benchmarks: i) the social optimum, which maximizes the aggregated 
group welfare, and ii) the standard model of purely self-interested strategic behavior, that lead to 
a Nash Equilibrium (Cardenas, 2004). Moreover, we modify the later benchmark to include the 
effect of external regulation –a penalty- on private individual benefits.  
 
a) Standard non-cooperative model 
 
The model presented here is based in the one proposed by Cardenas (2004) to which we are 
introducing dynamic effects so that benefits of individuals will be affected not only by  private 
and  collective  decisions  on  extraction  but  also  by  inter-temporal  effects  of  those  decisions. 
Suppose a person that extracts a resource and obtain benefit from it, for example a fisher. The 
benefits (and costs) that he/she receive from the extraction can be divided in two categories; on 
the one hand, there is a private benefit that depends on the level of extraction (x) but whose 
costs depend on the availability of the resource (S); on the other hand, there are benefits (or 
costs) from the decisions of all the fishers using the resource and affecting the availability for the 
other fishers. That is, this is a common-pool resource (CPR) that faces non exclusion but rivalry 
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where  t i, π indicates the benefits that fisher i obtains in period t from extracting the resource, 
which depends on the private benefit (f) –given by the own extraction (xit) and the availability of 
the resource (St)-, and the public effect (g) of the decisions –given by the sum of the decisions 
of all the fishers using the resource
3. 
 
In order to model the empirical approach for the experiment, some functional forms must be 
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where  0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ≥ > ≥ > γ β α S . The first one is a typical function whose revenues depend on a 
parameter α (perhaps the price of the resource in the market) and whose costs depend in a 
quadratic  direct  form  from  the  extraction  and  inversely  from  the  stock,  and  β  represents  a 
technical parameter associated to the costs. The second expression shows that the availability 
of  the  resource  is  affected  negatively  by  extraction.  This  effect  depends,  in  turn,  on  the 
parameter  γ,  that  represents  the  proportion  in  which  the  common-pool  resource  availability 
affects the own benefits. The parameter e represents the maximum amount that each fisher can 
extract and n the fishers using this resource.  
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The evolution equation states that the amount of the resource in period t+1 will equal the stock 
at the beginning of period t minus the extraction of all fishers during that period plus the net 
growth function –that in this case depends on the parameters θ and K
4. 
 
Given  these  functional  forms,  the  Nash  equilibrium  of  this  model  can  be  obtained  by  the 
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Where  δ  represents  the  discount  factor  (δ=1/(1+r)),  being  r  the  relevant  discount  rate.  The 
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where λt+1 represents the dynamic Lagrangian multiplier for every period. Considering the first 
order conditions for this problem and abstracting for the conditions related to the state and the 
co-state variables, the maximization condition with respect to the decision variable implies that: 
 




x δλ γ α
β
              (5) 
This expression represents the Nash equilibrium for the game and shows that the optimum 
private extraction depends positively on the available stock and the parameter α (the price of 
the resource), and negatively on the costs of extraction (β), the impact on aggregated benefits 
(γ) and the discounted inter-temporal price of the available resource (δλt+1). Note that in a static 
framework the private fisher will not consider this latter term. 
                                                 
 
4 The parameter θ can be thought as the implicit growth rate and the parameter K as the carrying capacity 
of the resource, and so, the growth function can be viewed as a logistic function. 11 
 
b) Social optimum model 
 
In order to obtain the level of extraction that maximizes the social welfare, a central planner 
would aggregate the benefits of all individuals, in this case the n fishermen:  
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Rewriting  the  function  to  be  maximized  and  constructing  the  Lagrangian,  the  problem  is  to 
maximize 
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The first order condition with respect to the extraction implies: 
 





x δλ γ α
β
.            (7) 
 
Expression (7) shows that when analyzing social welfare, the optimal level of extraction must be 
lower  than  that  in  expression  (5)  as  the  proportion  in  which  the  availability  of  CPR  affects 
benefits (gamma) must be aggregated for the total number of fishers -n- in order to capture the 
full costs of extraction decisions. 
 
Expressions (5) and (7) are used to construct pay-off tables that participants will use during the 
game.  We  assigned  values  to  the  parameters
5,  in  those  expressions  such  that,  we  could 
generate a pay-off structure clear enough that re-creates conflicts between individual and group 
                                                 
 
5 There are two equations, but six parameters to be defined, so some of them must be exogenously 
determined. 12 
 
gains, showing a social dilemma situation. Following previous field experiments conducted by 
Cardenas (2004) we chose the range of plausible extraction varying between 1 to 8 units, so 
that e =8. For the case of social optimum, it is assumed that individual fishers could extract at 
least  one  unit
6  while  the  Nash  equilibrium  is  adjusted  to  be  equivalent  to  eight  units  of 
extraction.  The  pay-off  tables  show  the  benefits  for  individual  i  of  different  combinations  of 
individual and aggregated extraction (annex 1). From tables it is possible to observe that as 
individual i increase his/her extraction, his/her payoffs increase, but as the aggregate extraction 
increases,  i´s  payoffs  decrease,  which  emulate  the  social  dilemma  between  individual  and 
collective interests. 
 
c) Standard non-cooperative model with external regulation 
 
In  order to  incorporate the  effect  of  external  regulation,  specifically  a  penalty,  on  fishermen 
extraction decisions, we include an additional expression to the inter-temporal maximization of 
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The expression  ) (
soc
i i x x − is the level of extraction above the one allowed. In this case, the 
permitted level of extraction is the social optimum; m is the level of penalty that is externally 
imposed  for  each  additional  unit  that  is  extracted  above  the  permitted  level  and,  finally, 
recognizing that control and monitoring is, at best, imperfect, ρ  represents the probability for a 
fisherman of being monitored and penalized by an authority. 
 
                                                 
 
6 Cardenas (2004) argues that it is convenient to eliminate the zero extraction option to avoid conflicts in 
conducting experiments that arise because there is strong aversion by villagers towards prohibitions to 
use resources. In addition, in the NNP-CRSB fishermen are allowed to extract resources for “self-
consumption”. 13 
 
Constructing Lagangrian expression and solving for first order conditions we obtain the following 
expression  that  show  the  optimal  private  level  of  extraction  when  an  external  regulation  is 
imposed and monitoring is imperfect. 
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Expression (9) shows that the optimal private level of extraction when an external regulation is 
imposed –assuming risk neutral individuals- should be lower than the level of extraction with no 
regulation, and depends –in addition to other factors already mentioned- upon the magnitude of 
the penalty and the probability of being monitored and sanctioned. So, the higher the penalty 
and the better the enforcement of regulations, theory predicts less extraction, ceteris paribus. 
 
Using this theoretical framework, we design the experiment to be conducted in field, as shown 
in the next section. 
 
3.  Experimental design 
 
Economic experimental games were carried out in five fishermen communities, three of them 
located within the limits of the NNP-CRSB and the others, located outside those limits. At every 
place, a group of approximately 30 people were gathered and organized in subgroups of five 
people each. The five-person group represented the collective decision entity in the experiment 
but  every  person  made  individual,  private  and  confidential  decisions  that  were  treated  as 
anonymous. Anonymity and confidentiality of individual decisions were guaranteed by seating 
players back to back and by the presence of a researcher who monitored and supervised each 
group and who collected individual extraction levels that fishermen wrote in an individual piece 
of paper.  
 
Experimental  game  was  performed  in  two  stages,  both  of  them  divided  in  ten  rounds  of 
decisions.  In  every  round  of  the  first  stage  (base  line),  each  player  must  decide  a  level  of 
extraction  ranging  from  1  to  8  units,  and  these  decisions  generated  points,  convertible  in 
monetary  units.  In  general,  the  higher  the  individual  extraction  the  higher  the  profits,  but  a 
decreasing rate. These profits, however, depended not only on individual decisions but also on 
the decisions made by the five-person group as a whole. The higher the full group extraction the 14 
 
lower  the  value  of  each  extracted  unit  for  every  player.  The  purpose  of  this  design  was  to 
highlight the dilemma of common-pool resources and the trade off between individual and social 
benefits. Each individual, privately, calculated his/her profits based on his/her own anonymous 
extraction and the aggregated extraction –which was made “public” after finishing every round 
by the researcher in charge of collecting individual extraction decisions-.  
 
In this experiment, as mentioned in the theoretical model, players were facing inter-temporal 
effects of their current decisions. In order to make the dynamic part of the game understandable 
for fisherman, and practical and operative for field work, we decided to manage two levels of the 
resource stock: High and Low. So, the dynamic part of the game was designed as follows: if the 
aggregated  extraction  (five-person  group  extraction)  exceeded  20  units,  the  stock  of  the 
resource  for  next  round  will  be  low,  meaning  low  availability  of  the  resource  in  next  round 
caused by over-extraction in current round. In this case, every unit of extraction was paid with 
fewer points as low availability of the resource implies more effort per unit of catch, which in turn 
generates, ceteris paribus, lower benefits. If the extraction by the whole group was less than 20 
units, for the next round all the players will face an abundant resource (High availability) that 
required less effort per unit of catch, and so higher returns to the activity. These two levels of 
stock will produce two different pay-off tables according with the benefit function in expression 
(1). 
 
Figure 1 shows the main components of the first phase of the experiment. This diagram is a 
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Figure 1 First phase of economic experimental games in NNP-CRSB 
 
Following the first 10 rounds, the groups started a second phase, with 10 additional rounds 
subject to different rules. There are four rules that were assigned to each group, which worked 
as follows: 
 
Rule 1: Continue on baseline. This rule is assigned to a control group and the players continue 
playing as in the first phase for 10 additional rounds. 
 
Rule 2: External regulation: Fine or penalty. The objective of this rule is to convince players to 
extract only one unit of the resource, using a fine imposed by an external regulator. In order to 
simulate the imperfect enforcement that is common in developing world, the monitoring decision 
is  random  and  every  player  has  1/10
th  of  probability  of  being  monitored  at  every  round. 
Operatively, imperfect monitoring is carried out using 10 balls, five white and five red (each red 
one with a number). One ball is picked up from a black bag and if the picked ball is white, there 16 
 
is no monitoring at all, while if the ball is red, the player with the number in the ball is inspected. 
For every unit of extraction above the one permitted, the monitored player must pay a fine, 
which is deducted from the points she/he got in the corresponding round. The extracted ball is 
returned to the bag so that a player could be monitored more than once. All the other rules keep 
as  in  the  baseline,  and  decisions  as  well  as  fines  keep  being  private  and  confidential.  No 
communication among players is allowed. 
 
Rule 3: Internal regulation: Communication. Under this rule, before starting the second stage, 
the group is allowed to have an internal talk of -at most- five minutes. Only the five members of 
the group are able to participate in this conversation, and although they are permitted to talk 
about the pay-offs, the game and the strategies, among others, they cannot make any promises 
or threats to their partners. Following this talk, a new set of ten rounds starts in which, repeated 
communication  of  two  minutes  is  allowed  between  rounds.  Despite  the  possibility  of 
communication, extraction decisions continue being private and confidential. 
 
Rule 4: Internal and external regulation: Co-management. Under this rule, and before starting 
the second phase, the group has the opportunity of talking, during five minutes, with an officer 
from the national park who enters into the game as an additional player. During that time, the 
representative of the authority exposes his/her ideas about the conservation of the park and 
tries to convince every member of the group to extract only one unit of the resource. Passing 
that period, the group has five more minutes to talk about the pay-offs, the game, the strategies 
or any other issue. Neither the representative of the authority nor the members of the group are 
allowed to make promises or threats during or after the game. Interventions of the park officer 
are recorded. When the group makes their decision –private and confidential- for the first round 
and the total extraction is announced, the park representative has another minute to talk to the 
group, and then, the group has an additional minute to discuss. For resting rounds this rule 
behave as in the second round. 
 
Figure 2 shows a diagram with treatments used during the second phase of experiments.  
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Figure 2 Second phase of economic experimental games in NNP-CRSB 
 
Following the theoretical model, the expected equilibrium of the game under base line is a level 
of extraction of 40 units (8 units per player), while the social equilibrium is a level of extraction of 
5 units (1 unit each). Under the external regulation treatment, the expected equilibrium is a level 
of extraction of 15 units (3 units each). The model does not predict any change in the decision 
under communication or co-management beyond the Nash equilibrium. 
 
Every participant in the experiment obtained points, convertible in money, being the average 
final payment an equivalent to the income they would have obtained in a typical working-day 
(about 1.5 daily minimum-wage equivalents). At the current rate, this payment is equivalent to 
10 dollars, so the five players playing the 20 rounds obtain about 50 dollars. The payments were 
confidential.  
 
After finishing the game, participants completed a survey and the main results of the game were 
presented  and  discussed  openly  with  players  and  park  officers.  This  socialization  was  very 18 
 
useful to think and discuss about different ways of managing resources in the park, and several 
lessons for the use of resources were obtained.  
 
4.  Empirical model 
 
There are five places where games were performed. These five places are divided according to 
the proximity to the National Natural Park into places inside the park and places outside the 
park. This distinction obeys to the assumption that communities inside the park are more willing 
to participate in initiatives with the authorities, while people living outside the park have been, 
historically, less attended by authorities and, in consequence, less able to engage in activities 
for the sustainable use of the park. In fact, people in communities inside the park use to blame 
those living outside the park as responsible for inadequate fishing arts and over exploitation in 
the park. There is no evidence of this assertion but it is expected a differentiation in the attitude 
between these two groups. Inside the park, the communities involved are Isla Grande, Santa 
Cruz del Islote and Mucura islands. Outside the park, there are two communities, Tierrabomba 
and  Bocachica  (Figure  3).  In  total,  135  persons  participated  in  the  games,  80  of  them  in 
locations inside the park and 55 in locations outside the park.  
 
 
Figure 3 Location of the park and communities 19 
 
Socioeconomic information of game participants 
 
As highlighted in the background section, people in these islands are mainly engaged in fishing 
activity (Figure 4). Education levels are in general low, averaging 6.1 years (elementary school) 
with small differences between inside and outside of the park participants (5.7 vs. 6.4).  
 
 
Figure 4 Main economic activities of participants 
 
Poverty is the rule in the area (and so standard of living is low), as can be observed in Figure 5: 
half of the experimental game participants’ households earn less than US$ 200 per month, and 
more than 90 percent of them do not reach the threshold of US$ 400 per month. Given an 
average of 5.5 members per household, it implies that half of the people survive with less than 
US$ 1.21 per capita and 90 percent with less than US$2.42.  
 
 
Figure 5 Household monthly income of participants 20 
 
Despite difficult conditions, these populations have been settled there for more than 50 years 
(on average more than three generations have been born there), showing that access to fish 
and other hydro biological resources might constitute –in addition to a source of income- a basis 
of consumption that might not be included in the calculation of income but can be of importance 




The distribution of players for each zone, according to the treatments they were exposed to, is 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Number of players inside and outside the park according to treatment 
Zone  Treatment 
Baseline  Communication  External reg  Co-management  Total 
Outside the park  10  15  15  15  55 
Inside the park  15  25  15  25  80 
Total  25  40  30  40  135 
 
According to the design of the experiment, the expected extraction level under non-cooperative 
setting was eight units of resource, while the social optimum was adjusted at one unit. When 
players were exposed to the game under the baseline (first 10 rounds), however, the extraction 
was lower than the theoretically-predicted Nash equilibrium. On average, the extraction during 
the first phase was 4.6 units, which is more than three units lower than the expected Nash 
equilibrium. Presumably, the state of the resource may explain part of this result. Comparing the 
extraction at different states, however, shows that, even though under high availability of stock 
the extraction tends to be higher than that under low availability (4.82 versus 4.44), both levels 
of  extraction  are  considerably  lower  than  the  expected  level  of  eight  units.  Although  the 
difference  is  statistically  significant  there  is  no  a  great  variation  in  decisions  along  first  ten 




Figure 6 Mean extraction decisions during first ten rounds under the two available resource stocks 
 
When comparing the first 10-round decisions between locations, it is observed that players in 
locations inside the park tend to extract lower than those located outside the park (Figure 7). 
Although the difference is not notorious, it is statistically significant (4.41 versus 4.88). 
 
 
Figure 7 Mean extraction decisions during first ten rounds according to the location 
 
Therefore, there is some evidence supporting the existence of differences on extraction level 
decisions between zones and under different resource stock availabilities. 
 
Having observed those facts, the most interesting part of the analysis is what happened during 
the second phase (set of rounds 11-20), when rules (treatments) where included in the game. In 
fact,  during  second  phase,  extraction  decisions  dropped  to  3.23  on  average. These results, 
however, vary from rule to rule as can be observed in Table 2. As expected, game participants 
that continued in baseline did not exhibit a significant change in decisions. For the other three 22 
 
rules,  communication  allowed  to  reduce  extraction  in  less  than  one  unit,  external  regulation 
(high fee) reduced extraction, on average, in almost two units, and co-management resulted to 
be the most effective rule, reducing the average extraction in more than two units with respect to 
the first  phase  (Table  2). This  is  a  compelling result for  policy  recommendations.  However, 
further analysis including location and resource availability should complement these findings. 
 
Given that the extraction variable ranges from 1 to 8, taking discrete values, data distribution 
does not behave normally and so, standard statistical tests might not be appropriate. To deal 
with  this  fact,  we  perform  the Wilcoxon  test  (also  known  as  the  Mann-Whitney  two  sample 
statistic).  Results  from  this  test,  as  well  as  an  estimate  of  the  probability  that  the  mean 
extraction  for  the  first  group  (in  this  case  Phase  one  or  rounds  1-10)  is  larger  than  the 
corresponding one for the second group (Phase two or rounds 11-20), are presented in Table 2. 
Standard tests on differences are consistent with non-parametric tests in all the cases. 
 
Table 2 Effect of treatments on extraction decisions  
Zone 
Treatment   
Baseline  Communication  External 
regulation 
Co-
management  Total 
Phase 1  4.76  4.17  4.99  4.63  4.60 
Phase 2  4.46  3.45  3.11  2.32  3.23 
Difference   0.30*  0.73***  1.88***  2.31***  1.37*** 
Mann-Whitney 
statistic  1.483
ns  4.516***  9.988***  14.729***  16.153*** 
Pr(PH1>PH2)  0.538  0.591  0.733  0.796  0.678 
*** significant at 1%  ** significant at 5%  * significant at 10% 
ns non-significant 
 
According  to  the  stock  availability,  it  is  interesting  to  observe  that  under  high  availability  of 
resource, decisions averaged 3.1, while during rounds under low availability of resource they 
were, on average, 3.6 units. That is, unlike first ten rounds, players tended –on average- to 
extract  more  resources  during  low-stock  rounds  (Table  3).  This  behavior,  however,  varies 
according  to  the  rule  the  participants  were  playing.  While  players  under  baseline  and 
communication treatments decided to extract, on average, more units when stock was high, 
those under external regulation and co-management rules decided to extract more when the 
stock exhibited low availability. Nevertheless, no matter the stock state, co-management rule 
induced participants to extract –on average- the lowest amounts. 
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Baseline  Communication  External 
regulation 
Co-
management  Total 
High stock  4.84  3.53  2.84  2.21  3.10 
Low stock  4.05  3.13  3.69  3.10  3.60 
Difference  0.79***  0.40**  -0.86***  -0.89***  -0.50*** 
Total  4.46  3.45  3.11  2.32  3.23 
Mann-Whitney 
statistic  2.707***  1.991**  -3.626***  -3.179***  -4.248*** 
Pr(high>low)  0.598  0.571  0.373  0.371  0.425 
*** significant at 1%  ** significant at 5%  * significant at 10%  
ns non-significant 
 
According to zone, it is observed that players located in communities outside the park extract –
during  the  second  phase-  significantly  more  than  those  inside  the  park  (3.77  versus  2.85). 
These figures must be analyzed case by case for every treatment before making conclusions.  
 
In Table 4 can be observed that locations outside the park exhibited different average results 
from locations inside it. Extraction averages inside the park tend to be lower than those outside 
the  park  for  communication  and  external  regulation  treatments,  and  these  differences  were 
significant. For the co-management rule, however, the effect is the opposite: players outside the 
park decided, on average, to extract less than those playing under the same rule inside the 
park. This observation presents an interesting policy implication: while external regulation and 
even communication do not have a strong effect on decisions made by people outside the park, 
having  the  chance  of  combining  internal  communication  and  some  environmental  education 
from park rangers induced them to reduce extraction at some of the lowest observed extraction 
averages. This implies that they are open to participate in rules aimed to sustainable use of the 
park when they are recognized by authorities and when education, training and involvement in 
participation are used as tools for encourage such positive actions. 
 
So far, these results show some evidence that rules such as communication, external regulation 
and co-management are able to modify extraction behavior, being co-management one of the 
most  relevant  in  terms  of  reducing  extraction  decisions.  These  results  also  imply  that 
participants  living  in  communities  outside  the  park may  have  different incentives  than  those 
living inside it and, therefore, their decisions may also be different. In addition, results show 
some evidence that stock availability may exert some changes in extraction patterns.  
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Table 4 Average extraction decisions for every rule during second phase according to location with 
respect to the park 
Zone 










management  Total 
Outside the 
park  4.88  5.21  4.08  4.20  2.05  3.77 
Inside the 
park  4.41  3.96  3.06  2.02  2.48  2.85 
Difference  0.47***  1.25***  1.02***  2.18***  -0.43**  0.91*** 
Total  4.60  4.46  3.45  3.11  2.32  3.23 
Mann-Whitney 
statistic  3.93***  4.37***  4.69***  4.22***  -3.90***  6.93*** 
Pr(out>in)  0.562  0.662  0.638  0.799  0.392  0.609 
*** significant at 1%  ** significant at 5%  * significant at 10%  
ns non-significant 
 
Given that stock availability in this experimental game reflects intertemporal effects of decisions 
and, ultimately, sustainability in the use of the resource, a deeper analysis of the performance of 
this  variable  is  included.  Results  show  that,  while  during  first  phase  (rounds  1-10)  stock 
exhibited,  on  average,  high  availability  in  42  percent  of  the  rounds,  during  second  phase 
(rounds 11-20) stock reached high availability in 74 percent of the rounds. Within second phase, 
rules  generated  significantly  different  results  (Figure  8).  Participants  that  continued  under 
baseline rule increased in a small amount the proportion of rounds that the stock reached high 
availability  (50  percent);  this  difference,  however,  is  not  statistically  significant.  External 
regulation rule induced participants to keep stock under high availability 68 percent of the times, 
being  significantly  greater  than  baseline.  Communication  rule  allowed  stock  to  be  on  high 
availability  80  percent  of  the  rounds,  and  co-management  rule  allowed  it  to  reach  high 
availability 88 percent of the rounds, being the most effective rule in terms of sustainability of the 




Figure 8 Percent of rounds that stock was in each possible level according to treatments 
 
State of resource stock also varied depending on the location of participants. In general, during 
second  phase,  84  percent  of  the  rounds  in  locations  inside  the  park  exhibited  high  stock 
availability while in those locations outside the park only 61 percent of the rounds reached high 
availability (Table 5). Although these differences were significant along most of the treatments, 
co-management  rule  showed  the  same  effectiveness  inside  and  outside  the  park.  If  the 
proportion of rounds under high availability reflects sustainability in the use of the resource, 
external regulation treatment in games performed outside the park was poorly effective as a tool 
for encouraging sustainable use, reflecting the reluctance of communities outside the park to 
comply with external and coercive rules.  
 
Table 5 Percent of rounds that stock was in high availability for games inside and outside the park 
according to rules 
Zone 
Treatment 
Baseline  Communication  External 
regulation 
Co-
management  Total 
Outside the park  40  63  47  87  61 
Inside the park  60  90  90  88  84 
Difference  -20***  -27***  -43***  -1  -23*** 
Total  52  80  68  88  74 
Mann-Whitney 
statistic 
-3.095***  -6.447***  -8.054***  -0.390
ns  -9.450*** 
Pr(out>in)  0.400  0.367  0.283  0.493  0.386 




Summarizing, these results show that co-management may in fact exert a positive incentive in 
participants to reduce extraction and maintain the resource at healthy stock levels. While other 
rules  may  generate  similar  effects  in  some  communities,  the  impacts  associated  to  co-
management are consistently better for communities inside and outside the park.   
 
5.  Conclusions  
 
Co-management, generally speaking, can be defined as an institutional arrangement in which 
there exist several degrees of power and responsibility sharing between state and local agents 
for the management of CPR. This arrangement, also called collaborative management or joint 
management, implies shared governance of resources between state regulation and self 
governing institutions (Feeny et al, 1998). In this study, in order to test collaborative strategies, 
using economic experimental games, we make operative the co-management concept by 
including an innovative rule that combined repeated communication among players with 
external non-coercive intervention from actual natural park officials.  
 
Results from this study support previous findings from field economic experimental games. First, 
our findings show that, unlike standard theory predicts, individuals do not extract the maximum 
amount of resources they are allowed to and therefore, their decisions deviates from the 
predicted Nash equilibrium. Second, economic experimental games we performed with 
fisherman communities confirm empirical evidence related with the role of cooperation in the 
management of CPR. Specifically, our findings show that repeated communication in 
experimental games induced players to make decisions about levels of extraction that were 
lower than those under treatments where communication was not permitted, deviating from 
Nash equilibrium strategies and approaching to the predicted social optimum. Third, our findings 
support previous findings about the weak role of external regulation for controlling levels of 
extraction associated to CPR. 
 
In addition to confirm previous findings from standard treatments, the results from this study 
make a relevant contribution to both behavioral economics and CPR management literature in 
two issues: first, the inclusion of a treatment in which a real natural park official –who daily 
works on environmental education issues with communities- participated as a player in the 
game, in a rule we called co-management, which was designed for testing complementarities 
between repeated communication and non-coercive authority intervention –as opposed to 27 
 
coercive external regulation-. This innovative treatment showed the best results in terms of 
levels of extraction, not only in communities located inside the park but also in fisherman 
communities located outside the park but fishing inside it. Levels of extraction under co-
management treatment were significantly lower, compared with any other treatment, in all 
locations were games were performed. This finding suggests that non-coercive strategies –as 
the one tested here- could generate better responses from communities in terms of 
conservation and improved management of CPR, not only because asymmetries in information 
are reduced during the interaction between fishers and natural park officials, but also because 
communication lets agents understand that social conservation goals, fisherman community –or 
collective- interests, and individual interests can be reached simultaneously and therefore that 
they are complementary, no substitutes.  
 
Fishermen know and recognize that over-exploitation and use of inadequate fishing methods 
cause degradation and, at the end, depletion of marine resources. They also know, however, 
that acting alone they cannot change the situation. This may be one of the cases, as Ostrom 
(1990) establishes, in which individuals may not be able to communicate with one another and 
have no way to develop trust or do not have the capacity to recognize explicitly that they share a 
common goal. In such cases, some external support is needed to break out the perverse logic 
of their situation (Ostrom, 1990). This is when the role of authorities providing information and 
education and facilitating and encouraging community participation in decision making process, 
in developing strategies, and in monitoring and control activities, is crucial.  
 
A very important finding is that co-management rule induced the lowest level of extraction in 
fisherman communities living outside the park. This finding becomes relevant by comparing co-
management with other treatments, particularly external regulation in those communities. 
External regulation treatment results show that communities outside the park do not have any 
fear to be caught violating rules and regulations, maybe because currently the only relationship 
between those communities and park authorities is a coercive one, unlike the relationship with 
communities located inside the park, in which communities and park authorities have a wider 
and more frequent range of interactions.  
 
Another important contribution of this study has to be with the dynamic effect of extraction 
decisions.  We approached a measurement of sustainability in the use of the resource analyzing 
the proportion of rounds in which individuals let the resource be in a state of high availability. 28 
 
During baseline rounds –no rules imposed- the number of rounds with low availability of the 
resource exceeded rounds with high availability although, on average, levels of extraction were 
smaller under low availability. This finding suggests that although individuals act myopically in 
the sense that they do not take into account the effect of current decisions on future state of the 
resource, when the resource exhibits low availability they do restrict their level of extraction, 
avoiding the over effort required for extracting the last marginal unit when availability of resource 
is low.  
 
In contrast, during the second stage of the game (rounds 11-20) –rules imposed-,  individuals 
kept , on average, a greater number of rounds with high availability of the resource, implying 
that rules might have had an effect on inter temporal decision of players. It suggests that rules 
can play a relevant role on inducing individuals to incorporate future effects of current extraction 
decisions on state of the resource being exploited.  
 
This study is still in progress and further research including econometric analysis will be 
performed, in which characteristics of individuals, groups and locations will be tested as 
variables affecting extraction decisions. Given the nature of data, negative binomial 
specifications for cross sectional data are being prepared for the econometric approach. 
Besides, additional and complementary research must be carried out in order to better 
understand the inter temporal logic of fishers’ extraction decisions. Particularly, innovative 
games should be designed to better capture the implicit behavior of fishers and to illustrate 
easily to players the effect of overuse of renewable vulnerable marine resources. These 
innovative designs should include visual tools that facilitate the understanding of the game by 
communities with very low levels of education.  
 
Additionally, real field experiments, in which the different rules –external regulation, self –
regulation and co-management- could be tested in some selected fishing zones during specific 
periods of time and both communities and park authorities participate actively, would support 
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Annex 1. Pay-off tables  
 
Green pay-off table for HIGH resource availability and pink pay-off table for LOW resource 
availability 
 
 